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AN INTERESTING QUESTION IN EMINENT
DOMAIN UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
THERE has not been delivered, by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania-probably for a very ]ong time-so important a
decision as the one in the case of PennsylvaniaRd. v. Lippincott,
19 W. N. C. 513, wherein the court held that, "A railroad
company constructing and operating an elevated road upon
property owned by it in fee simple, fronting on one side of a
street, is not liable under the new Constitution,' or otherwise,
for depreciation in value of property fronting upon the opposite
side of the street, in consequence of noise, disturbance, smoke,
sparks, vapor, necessarily resulting from the operation of the
road as a steam railway, where no part of said last-mentioned
property or any right of way or other appurtenance belonging
thereunto has been taken or used in the erection or construction
of the road."
Public roads, turnpikes, plank-roads, streets, canals, railroads,
and bridges are public highways, if the owners thereof have
been invested with the privilege of eminent domain and in Pennsylvania it follows from MeClenachan v. Carwin,2 owing to
I The new Constitution (1874), Art. 16, 8, provides that: " Municipal and
other corporations and individuals invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use, shall make just compensation for property taken,
injured or destroyed by the construction or enlargement of their works, highways, or improvements, which compensation shall be pai t or secured before
such taking, injury, or destruction."
3 Yeates 362, 371.
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Penn's concessions, that public roads could be authorized by the
legislature to cut through the cultivated fields of our farmer
ancestors without any obligation for damages; so navigation
companies on our navigable rivers-they being public highways
-- could equally be authorized to destroy the water-power of
mills without making any remuneration for what might prove
absolute ruin to the owners, and later on, when railroads were
introduced-they also being public highways-the streets of our
towns and cities were liable to be invaded by these railroads at
the will of the legislature, without one cent of compensation to
the adjoining property owners. Any compensation which the
legislature chose to grant, was of grace and not of right,
hence the people were forced to rely upon the justice of a legislature sometimes too complacent in so far as regards the corporations. It is only fair to add, however, that few special charters were granted to these quasi-public' corporations, wherein
compensation was not allowed for the taking of private property.
Under the amended Constitution of 1838, it was decided that
compensation should be made only for land actually taken.
When this provision vas introduced, improved roads, turnpikes,
plank-roads, and canals were the public highways, and under
these conditions it will be readily seen that the Constitution, by
providing compensation for land actually taken, would afford an
adequate remedy. It was evidently felt that little or no harm
could be done, save where property was actually appropriated,
and it was therefore thought that this construction of the constitutional check on the legislature would give to the people all the
relief to which they were entitled. During the next eleven years
-1838 to 1849-however, railroads had come into extensive
use, and it was realized that the Constitution of 1838 did not grant
adequate relief; it was found that railway trains rushing over a
man's land might cause a permanent injury to and a corresponding depreciation in the value of his whole property, hence the
General Railroad Act of 1849 remedied this omission by providing compensation not only for the lands taken, but where any land
was taken, then compensation also for the injury to the remaining land. Again it was found-when these general laws were
tested in the courts-that they operated inequitably, thus:
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under these laws, if ever so small a piece of one's ("1A ") land
were taken, lie not only recovered compensation for this, but alzo
damages to his remaining land, but his less fortunate neighbor
("B ")-less fortunate because the company had not taken a little
piece of his land-had no redress; as to him the injury was
damnun absque bhjuria, his land may have been equally near
the railroad, his measure of damages would have been computed
as was "A's," had only a little piece of his laud been taken. Yet
" A " recovered for this injury to his land vot taken, because
some of it, perhaps a small corner of it, had been taken, whilst
as to "B," who experienced the same depreciation in value from
the same causes, the injury was dainnum absque injtria,because
a little piece of his land, no matter how small, had not been
taken. This was one of the faults of these General Railroad
Laws, which the provision of the new Constitution was intended to remedy.
Let us compare this new Constitution with the amended
Constitution of 1838. The phraseology of the two is so very
different it is apparent that the former instrument contemplated
a very much wider extension of the right of recovery. In the
Constitution of 1838 it was an inhibition upon the legislative
power to grant eminent domain, i. e., "Ithe legislature shall not
invest, etc., etc." In the Constitution of 1874 a very different
object was in view; it was not, primarily, an inhibition upon
the legislative power to grant eminent domain, this the people
did not intend to interfere with, but it was:'.,funieipal and other corporations and individuals invested
with the privilege of taking private prolerty for ))ublhc use,
etc., etc.," that is, this clause is used to designate a certain class
of corporations invested with eminent domain. Who are invested with eminent domain? Why, railroads, canals, etc., etc.;
these are liable to produce a distinct and particular injury peculiar
to themselves, and it was against these distinct and peculiar injuries
that the Constitution was intended to provide a remedy. Then
follows the remedial clause, "shall make just compensation for
property taken, injured, or destroyed, etc., etc." This is very
different from authorizing the exercise of eminent domain,
under certain qualifications; on the contrary it only indicates a
certain class as being subject to a certain law; it is not, corpora-
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tion shall not be invested with the privilege, etc., etc., as in the
Constitution of 1838, but it is, corporations invested-note the
past tense-with the privilege, etc., etc., shall be subjected to
certain obligations, whether the injury they cause is the direct
result of their acquisition under eminent domain or not. In
other words, corporations possessing the right of eminent
domain can enforce it; it is, therefore, really immaterial whether
they acquire the property under the exercise of this right or
purchase it outright at private sale,' for in any such sale the
controlling factor must be their right under eminent domain.
Thus I think it is clear that the expression, "invested with the
1ight,"
etc., etc., is intended as designating a class subject to the
remaining terms of the clause, that is, these corporations shall
make compensation for property taken, property injured, or
property destroyed.
We have tried in the previous pages to present the growth of
what may be called the public highway laws. Hitherto I have
referred, in a general way only, however, to the various decisions under these laws, but I now propose to consider them in
detail, to show what has been held an injury of that character
for which compensation should be granted, and to compare
these decisions with that in PennsylvaniaRailroad Company v.
Lippincott, 19 W. N. C. 513, wherein damages were not
allowed, to see if these decisions are logical and consistent. Before doing so, however, it would be well to state that the words
"direct," "immediate," "1consequential," and "1remote'" are
used in connection with this subject of damages under the new
Constitution in a loose way, which robs them of their true
meaning. It seems to me that the injury is direct, immediate,
and consequential, without regard to property being taken or
not-whether a legal injury will depend upon the common law
or the statutes, or the Constitution; an injury is speculative,
where it has no practical existence, but arises from a mere possibility-an imaginative fear and an injury is too remote, where
it results from the company simply carrying on its business, as
I Of course, one who has sold his property to a railroad has no further
claim for damages to that property; but what I mean i3, no matter how they
acquire their property, either under eminent domain or at private sale, they
are liable for legal injury to other property.
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loss of trade to stage-coach companies, or of custom to inns, by
reason of the introduction of a railway. The true point in any
given case is, the plaintiff must have sufflred a special lcgal damage, and it is immaterial whether it is immediate or consequential.'
The injury may be said to be conscquential in the
sense that it is the result of the corporate action, but if'
it is
one for which a legal remedy is provided, then it is a direct,
immediate legal wrong ; but if the injury is a mere speculative,
possible one, if it does not exist, but is a mere phantom of the
mind, or if too remote, it cannot be considered.
Again, the legal maxim, " damnum absque in/uria," is often
misunderstood. Upon this point, Mr. Justice STEPHENS said :2
The maxim that there is no wrong without a remedy does
not mean, as it is sometimes supposed, that there is a legal
remedy for every moral or political wrong. If this were its
meaning, it would be manifestly untrue. There is no legal
remedy for the breach of a solemn promise not under seal,
and made without consideration, etc., etc. The maxim
means only that legal wrong and legal remedy are correlative
terms, and it would be more intelligibly and correctly stated, if
it were reversed so as to stand, where there is no legal remedy,
there is no legal wrong." This is the true nleaning; dtniuwn
absque injuria has nothing to do with whether the injury is
under the common law, a statute, or a constitutional provision,
the injury may be saved from being damnam absque njtria as
well by a statute or a constitutional provision as by the conmnon
law; legal wrong and legal remedy are correlative terms ; thus
the common law has provided no legal remedy for the breach of
a promise not tinder seal and without consideration, hence there
is no legal wrong; but if a statute or constitutional provision
were passed establishing a legal remedy, then the breach of such
a promise would be a legal wrong, that is, a damage where there
is no legal remedy is " damnum absque injuria,3 but the moment a legal remedy is provided, it ceases to be damnum absque
ihjuaria and becomes a legal wrong for those within the legal
remedy.
'Hughes v. Heister, 1 Binn. 462.
Bradlaugh v. Gosselt, 12 Q. B. D. 271, 285.
3SItrunk v. Schuylkll Nav. Co., 14 S. & R. 71, 83.
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Considering our Pennsylvania decisions upon this question of
damages, this principle must be borne in mind for example,
under the General Railroad Law of 1849, where any portion of
a man's land was taken, the injury to the remaining land was
not "damnurm absque injuria," because the statute provided a
remedy for such injury, but where no land was taken a similar
injury to a neighbor was damnum absque injuria,because the
statute only provided a remedy where one's land was taken;
hence the intention of the Constitution of 1874 was to provide
a legal remedy where no portion of one's land had been takento prevent that being damnum absque injuria,which, under the
earlier statute of 1849, had been so.
Accepting Mr. Justice STEPHENS' definition of the maxim as
correct, the theory that the word "injured" in the Constitution
means a legal wrong in the sense that the word legal means the
common law only, is not sound; for the words remedy and
wrong are correlative terms, and instead of the legal wrong existing without the remedy, it is the existence of tie legal remedy
that creates the legal wrong. Now, the Constitution, by providing the remedy, establishes the legal wrong, "when any
man's properly is injured, compensation shall be made."
It has been stated that: "There is a wide distinction between
the legal meanings of the words ' damaged' and 'injured,' the
one signifying any loss of value to property, the other signifying a loss for which an action lies. This distinction is pointed
nowhere more. forcibly than in the familiar phrase,' damnum
absque injuria."' The above, whilst correct, is not fairly stated.
It would seem to imply a fallacy ; it makes it appear that the
word "injured " in the Constitution was meant to refer to a loss
for which there was no recovery; this is absurd; the word is
used, of course, simply to establish a remedy for thosewho can
avail themselves of it. The maxim means, and cannot mean
anything more than this-where there is no legal remedy there
is no legal wrong; damnum absque injuria-damaged without
injury!! Why ? Because the common law, a statute or a constitutional provision has not provided a legal remedy, that is to
say (1), an injury is only a legal wrong when a legal remedy is
provided, and (2), in order that one can avail one's self of the
legal remedy, one's right of property must have been invaded
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or the special class of injury must have been specially brought
within the remedy. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
correctly interpreted this maxim, as exemplified in the following cases, wherein it will be seen that the court held that the
legislature had intended to provide compensation for iljuries
only, which would have been remedied at common law, but by
examining these eases and in this examination I wish to emuphasize strongly the fact that the words of the court should be carefully considered, in connection with (a) the words of the statute
creating tile liability, and (b), with the claim of the plaintiff
under tile statute. Looking at the eases in this light, it will be
appreciated that what the court meant was that the plaintifl in
each case had no rights at all, therefore, the remedy was not
applicable to them; that they claimed damages for an injury
to something to which they had no right, and to which they
would not have had a right had the company's works never
been constructed. Thus, in Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nav. Coinpany,
14 S. & iR. 71, 83, an injury to a right of fishery, but court replied, you never had a right of fishery, therefore, no commonlaw wrong; in Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal and Nav.
Conmpany, 4 Rawle 9, 23, injury to a pier by reason of a flood,
but court replied, the flood was the act of God, therefore, no
common-law wrong; in lalson v. Pittsburgh, etc., Rd. Coampany, 1 Wright 469, in estimating injury plaintiff wished to
consider what the lands would be worth at some future time,
court replied, this is wholly fanciful. The plaintiff also wanted
to prove simply the depreciation in value of the property, without
confining witnesses to the direct and necessary consequences of
the occupation; but the court replied, this was going too far,
for the jury could thus take into the estimate any consequences,
no matter how remote, and this, moreover, was the duty of tile
court, to decide if any given claim for damages was within the
law. In Sunbury, etc., Rd. v. I-Tmmell, 3 Casey 99, an injury
arising from the risk of fire from a locomotive, court replied,
purely speculative, hence no injury at common law; and in
Pittsburgh, etc., Rd. v. Jones, 1 Amer. 204, an injury to a ferry
franchise by diversion of business by reason of the railroad
tracks crossing the street at which the ferry-boats landed; but
court replied, ferry franchise gave no right to land, hence no
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injury at common law. Thus in the above cases, by considering
the plaintiffs' claims, it will be readily seen that they demanded
compensation for injury to things to which they had no right.
These cases do not bold, had the plaintiffs possessed a right to
the things themselves, that an injury to them would not have
entitled one to compensation; but, on the contrary, they only
hold, having no right to the things in question, of course
they could suffer no common-law wrong, and this is the sense in
which the expression common-law wrong is used; it is important to note that the cases are not intended to, and, as an actual fact,
do not attempt to decide what injuries are common-law wrongs.
Bat in the following cases, as the legal remedy applied to the
plaintiff's claims, the injury was a legal wrong and not damnum
absque injuria; thus in Commonwealth v. Snyder,' charter provided compensation for interference in any way with any person's rights of property; Snyder claimed damages because the
canal company, by erecting a dam across the creek, forced the
water back into Back Creek, and from this latter upon his papermill, so that he could not use the same for six weeks; the court
replied, the legal remedy was applicable to Snyder, hence the
injury was a legal wrong. It was not damnurm absque imjuria,
because Plum Creek being non-navigable, he had a right of
2
property in it. So in Barclay Rd. and Coal Co. v. Ingham,
Inghar claimed damages as owner of a mill-dam on a non-navigable stream for destruction of the water-power by the erection
of an embankment in said stream; court replied, the legal remedy was applicable to Ingham, hence the injury was a legal
wrong; it was not damnum absque injuria, because the stream
being non-navigable, he had a right of property in it. Again,
in Dugan v. Bridge Co.,3 charter provided not to impair or ob1 2 Watts 418.
2 12 Casey 200.
33 Casey 303. This case may be considered as the converse of Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co.; in neither case did plaintiffi have any absolute right of
property; in Shrunk's case the claim was denied because the remedy did not
provide for compensation for destruction of fishery, whilst in Dugan's cae the
remedy was provided for compensation for impairment or obstruction of navigation, although, the river being a navigable one and therefore a public highway, the legislature could have given the right to obstruct; in the former
case there was no recovery, whilst in the latter there was, yet in neither case
was there any absolute right of property injured.
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struct navigation; plaintiff claimed damages for obstructing his
right of passage on the river as a public highway ; court replied,
the legal remedy was applicable to Dugan, hence the injury was
a legal wrong; that the legislature could have parted with the
power not to obstruct, but they had not done so, hence company
was liable for obstructing.
I have cited these two types of cases at length, because it has
seemed to me they illustrate the true meaning of the maxim
damnum. absague injuria,that is to say: (1) An injury is only
a legal wrong when a legal remedy is provided, and (2) in order
that one can avail one's self of the legal remedy, one's right of
property must have been invaded, or the injury for which one
claims compensation must have been brought especially within
the remedy. There are, of course, a large class of injuries which
the constitutional provisions were not intended to embrace, and
this type of injury is well illustrated in the following cases, thus,
in Pittsburgh, etc., Bd. v. Jones,1 loss of business to a ferry

company, occurring by reason of the railroad tracks crossing the
street at which the ferry-boat landed, the latter having no right
to land under the ferry franchise, was clearly not an injury contemplated by the Constitution; so also in Edmundson v. Pittsburgh, etc., Rd. 2 carelessness and negligence are not necessary
results in constructing a railroad; again, in Searle v. Lackawanna, etc., Rd.,3 the increased inconvenience and expense there
would be in the future working of mines now unopened, but
when they should be opened, should not be considered, nor
should it be considered as an injury, in estimating the damages,
what the property would have been worth at some future time,
as was urged in Watson v. Pittsburgh,etc., Rd.,4 nor the risk of
accidental fire, as in Sunbury & Erie Rd. v. Hummell ;5 again,
as in Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal and Nay. Co.,' and in
Pittsburgh., etc., Bd. v. Gilleland7 where the injury is the result
of the act of God, there should be no recovery under the constitutional provision. In other words, there is no relief where the
injury is purely speculative, i. e., that-which may in the future
II

Amer. 204.

2 1 Amer. 316.
9 Casey 571.
4 1 Wright 469.
3

V L. XXXVI.-2

5 3 Casey 99.
6 4 Rawle 9, 23.
7 6 Smith 445.
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take place, or where there are no rights invaded, or where the
injury is common to all persons alike, or where it arises simply
from the company doing that which they are authorized to do,
independently of committing a nuisance, as loss of trade; thus a
railroad may, by carrying freight and passengers, destroy the
trade of canal and stage-coach companies, and of innkeepers
along the route; these would not be considered injuries for
which the Constitution had provided a remedy. This type of injury is nowhere better explained than in Shrunk v. Schuylkill
Nav. Co.,' by Chief Justice TILGHMAN, wherein, in examining
the act before him, he says: "The next observation that arises
is that all injuries mentioned in the act are those which are done
to property immediately, such as inundation of land, the swelling of the water into tail-races of mills, the taking away of
earth, stone, or other material, or the carrying of a canal or lock
through a man's land. These are palpable and direct, so there
can be no dispute about the injury. Compensation shall be made
for all damage arising from immediate injury to property, but
not for any damage where there is no legal injury, which is
called damnum absque injruia."
Now the explanation of these words is this: the learned chief
justice examines the act to find out what injuries are meant,
and lie finds any injury by a dam being erected, such as inundation, injury to tail-races of mills, etc., and he correctly coneludes that the injury inthe act must mean an immediate injury
to property, but he does not attempt to define what is an immediate injury to property, he simply finds that the injury complained of was not. The remainder of the opinion deals with
the principle, what injuries are too remote to be entitled to compensation? But first it should te stated that the principle is
clearly announced by the counsel for the defendant in the following words: "The plaintiff had no right to the fish or the
water, and with equal propriety might any one maintain an
action who, by the erection of the dam, is deprived of the opportunity of catching a shad above the falls." It will be seen that
the chief justice follows this principle for establishing too remote damages, for he says: "There would be no end to damages
114 S. & R. 71, 83; see also Proprs. of Locke & Ganals v. NYashua & Lowdl
Bd., 10 Cush. 385, per Sm.,%w, C. J.

DOMAIN UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

11

for injuries, considered in the most extensive sense of the word.
For not only may the owners of land contiguous to the river
complain of injury by the obstruction to the ascent of the fish,
but also all other persons living in towns or lands near the river.
All these persons feel the loss of fish. All persons accustomed
to fish with an angle or a hoop net may truly say they are injured. There are other kinds of injuries too, sustained particularly by owners of lands on the river between Fairmount and
the lower Falls; all these persons have lost the benefit of navigation free from toll in batteaux, flats, which was very useful, as
it served to carry produce to market and to bring up manure
for their lands. Yet it has not been contended that for such
injuries compensation is to be made. Suppose the health of the
country to be injured by the evaporation from the dams, is compensation to be made for this, the greatest of all injuries? I
presume not. Where, then, are we to stop, or what is to be the
boundary if we go beyond the limit I have mentioned ? I confess I should beat a loss to fix any one. * * * * * The
plaintiff had no property either in thefish or the rqier,and he was
bound to know the law by which the river remained public property, and of course all emoluments from fisheries were precarious." Here the learned chief justice states the principle that
there is no recovery where the injury is common to all alike, nor
where the right of action is merely personal and not incident to
the ownershipof the property-these injuries are all too remotebut, on the contrary, that there should be a recovery if the injury
is incident to the ownership, if the property is subjected to a perpetual servitude-then the owner's interest in it is injured; this
is the key-stone to the true principle: if the property is subjected,
by reasonof theworks to a perpetualservitude,then to theextent of that
servitude,is the owner's interestin thepropertyinjured. It has been
held in England that noise, smoke, soot, etc., are such servitudes,
and that vibrations from passing trains are also such servitudes 2
Now, if this be so, the question remains, are they such servitudes
as the law intends to be compensated? In England this quesI Tamer v.
2

The Sheffield & Botherman By. Co., 10 11. & W. 425.
.Hammersmith & City Radway Co. v. Brand, L. R., 4 Eng. & Irs. App. 171.

It was not doubted that this was an injury, but it was held there was no recovery under the construction of the statute on another pcint.
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tion came up' in the construction of the Land Clauses Consolidation Act and the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act,2 wherein
it was held iijuries iyflicted by the construction meant simply by
the actualconstruction, and not by the use as a way-going concern;
so, of course, there was no compensation for the vibrations, although
1

Hammersmith & City ly. Co. v. Brand, L. R., 4 Eng. & Irs. App. Cas., 171.
There is one very important thought in connection with the meaning
placed upon the word "construction" by the judges in this English case
[Hammersmith, etc., Bly. Co. v. Brand, supra], which could not apply in Pennsylvania; in fact, the point I mean, not existing with us, however, is the one
which probably led the English court to hold that the word "construction"
meant the actual construction, and our courts to hold that the same word meant
a way-going concern, thus; in England, Parliament is sovereign [that Parliament is sovereign is made clear in that delightfl book, " The Law of the Constitutioni" by Professor A. V. Dicey; wherein be says (p. 64) "Parliamentary
sovereignty is, therefore, an undoubted legal fact. It is complete both on its
positive and on its negative side. Parliament can legally legislate on any topic
whatever which in the judgment of Parliament is a fit subject for legislation.
There is no power which, under the Constitution, can come into rivalry with
the legislative sovereignty of Parliament"], hence, Parliament being sovereign,
all the judges held, first, that Parliament did that which they had thesovereign
power to do, to wit: by authorizing the railway to be constructed and used,
they did, by this very act, legalize the nuisance of working the railway ; hence
it can very readily be seen the effect that this parliamentary sovereignty
would have upon the minds of the judges in seeking for a meaning of the word
"construction," occurring in the very act which legalized the running of trains.
It would bealmost a solecism, where the words " use" and "construction" are
almost indiscriminately used, and where the word "construction," as it
appears in the att [see Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, ? 6, 16], seems
to be used in connection with the actual construction of the road, to hold that
it meant to apply to the running of trains, the nuisance of which Parliament
had the sovereign power to legalize. Lord CAmNs dissented, taking the
broader ground that the word " construction " means a way-going concern, and
with him were three out of the remaining eight judges; but I wish to show
how the minds of the majority could have been influenced by the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty. With us in Pennsylvania, however, the legislature is not sovereign, in so far as it is controlled by the Constitution; hence
it cannot legalize any nuisance which the Constitution has not given it the
power to legalize; so that the factor which was present to the minds of the
English judges in deciding upon the meaning of the word " construction" in
an English parliamentary sovereign act, was absolutely absent, and correctly
so, from the minds of the members of our Supreme Court, where they had to
deal with the same word in our Constitution. They decided the word had a
broader meaning than that of a mere actual construction, but meant construction as a way-going concern. That is, our Constitution gave no power to our
legislature to legalize any nuisance, but was a check on any such power.
The Constitution, standing over the legislature with the sword of Damocles,
2
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the court conceded that the property was subjected to an injurious
servitude. Lord CAIuts dissented from this construction and
adopted the broader, more catholic view-injuriously affected by
the construction-as a way-going concern. Our constitutional
provision is somewhat similar to the English statute, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has, I think correctly, taken a
position similar to that of Lord CAIRNS, that the word "construction means the way-going concern. Of course, this does
not mean that the railroad is always liable for damages arising
from the use, this contention would be absurd, but what it
does mean is this: upon paying damages arising from the construction of the road as a way-going concern, and thus having
subjected the property to a perpetual servitude, and having paid
for this right of servitude, of course it can use it. Had the
word "use" been resorted to in the Constitution, it would probably have been contended that the road would have been continually liable for these damages, whereas by the use of the word
Cconstruction" in the sense of a way-going concern, it follows
that whenever a road subjects a property to a perpetual servitude, and pays for the injury resulting from that servitude,
it receives in return a perpetual right to charge that property with
the said servitude, and, of course, is never ag-ain liable for the
said use. That the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that
the word "construction" is used in the sense of a way-going
concern, I think is beyond doubt. 1
says: You can create railroads, you can authorize them to run anywhere, you
can authorize them to exercise their powers, but subject to compensation for
the injuries they cause. Railroads had, previously to the new Constitution,
been liable where land was taken for the injury as a way-going concern, and
the people in the Constitution used the word " construction" in that sense.
1In Lycoming Gas Water Co.v. .Moyer, 3 Out. 615, if in the "construction"
of its works any injury should be done to private property, compensation
should be made. Moyer claimed damages, because the company tapped a small
run, in order to procure water for its works, thereby diminishing the flow of
water into his race. That is, the water was taken from the race for the company's use as way-going concern, yet the charter provided compensation for injury in the "construction;" still the court held that Moyer should recover"construction" meant the way-going concern. To the same effect is City of
.Reading v. Alttouse, 12 Norris 400, under the new Constitution. In Western
Penn. BRd. v. Hill, 6 Smith 460, Hill claimed damages for decrease of the business of the mill, by reason of the danger of driving horses near it, and the
danger to persons going to and from the mill. The court said: the direct and
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There is another legal principle which requires explanation.
"Every man has the right to the natural use and enjoyment of
his own property, and if, whilst lawfully in such use and enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part an unavoidable
loss occurs to his neighbor, it is damnum absqtue injuria,for the
rightful use of one's land may cause damage to another without
any legal wrong." This principle is expressed in the maxim,
"sic utere tuo, ut alienurm non. cedus," of which it has been said,
the maxim "is no help to decision, as it cannot be applied till the
decision is made."
This is very true, but there is an underlying principle illustrating what the courts have considered "the natural use and
enjoyment of one's own property." Our own Supreme Court
has clearly shown this distinction in the following cases: In
.Penn. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 18 W. N. 0. 181, the plaintiff
claimed damages for the pollution of a stream running through
his land by the "pumpings" out of a mine on the company's
work, the said "pumpings" being the necessary result of the
natural use and development of the coal property. The court
held, in effect, as the property was coal property, the natural use
of it was-to develop it, and that the removal of the water from
the workings of a coal mine was essential to the business of
coal mining, as also was its discharge into the natural water
courses. In Pottstown Gas Co. v. Mu;phy, 3 Wright 257, the
plaintiff below claimed damages because the gas from the company's works percolated into his well. The company urged not
immediate results of the "construction" of a road over land taken, if injurious, gives title to compensation, and as the court sustained Hill's claim, they
must have used the word "construction" in the sense of a way-going concern,
for that was the only way in which Hill claimed damages. To the same effect
is II.jrnstein v. Atlantic, etc., Bd., 1 Smith 87. In Wilmington, etc., f1. v.
Stauffer, 10 Smith 374, Stauffer claimed damages for the loss of use of his
barn, which by reason of its proximity to the railroad, was rendered unsafe to
use as a barn from the danger of fire. The court sustained this claim, thus
holding the railroad as a way-going concern.
In the above, I have cited a few cases under the new Constitution-where the
words used are "in the constructionof their works, etc., etc.," and a few cases under

the General Railroad Act of 1849-where the words used in providing for
damages (see Purdon, p. 1219, 35), are: "in consequence of thc making or opening
of said railroad,etc., etc.," so it is clear beyond question, that the Supreme Court
have interpreted the words "making or opening" and '"
construction," as meaning a way-going concern.
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liable, because authorized by the legislature to carry on this
business, that is, to use their own property for the purpose for
which they had been incorporated, but the court held they were
liable for damages.
Now what is the difference between these two types of cases?
Neither was possessed of eminent domain, so the question was
clearly, what is the proper use of one's property ? One was
liable in damages for the use he made of his property, whilst
the other was not. The coal company's use of its land was the
absolute, proper, and legitimate use of it, it was the only profitable and economic use to which the land could be placed, and
the bringing the water to the surface of the mine and allowing
it to find the natural water-courses was a necessity -of the making a proper use of the land, hence the doctrine, sic utere tuo, ut
aieanum non lmdas, was complied with; in the case of the gas
company it was not a clear legitimate use of the land; the percolating of the gas was not the outgrowth of the use, but it was
something which the gas company produced on the land, and,
therefore, for the gas company to place their works in such a
position as to injure a neighbor was their own deliberate act and
was not the absolute economic legitimate use of their own land as
land, hence liable. Again, in a late English case in the House
of Lords, Iammersmith, etc., By. Co. v. Brand, L. R., 4 Eng.
& Irish App. 195, it was shown that a railway in a city was not
a natural use of land. Mr. Justice BLACKBURN, saying : "I think
it is agreed on al hands that if a person not authorized by act
of parliament,' so to do, erected a railway or any other private
road on his own laud, and then worked it by running locomotives and trains or any other species of carriages upon it, so that
the vibrations and noise were to such an extent as really to be
annoying a neighbor, that injury would be a nuisance."
What is a nuisance? It is subjecting another's property "to
a servitude whereby the owner's interest in the same is injuriously affected. It is the continuous doing of something which
interferes with another's health or comfort in the occupation of
his property, such as carrying on a noisy or offensive trade. It is
not necessary to constitute private nuisance that the acts or state
I We have previously shown that parliament is sovereign and can legalize a
nuisance.
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of things complained of should be noxious in the sense of being
injurious to health. It is enough that there is a natural interference with the ordinary comfort and convenience of life-the
physical comfort of human existence-by an ordinary and reasonable standard." Pollock on Torts 330 et seq. Smoke, unaccompanied with noise or noxious vapors ; noise alone ; offensive
vapor alone, although not injurious to health, may severally constitute a nuisance to the owner of an adjoining or neighboring
property.' I have placed the word "neighboring" in italics
because it is very important to note that nuisance upon
principle and authority, cannot be confined to an adjoining
property alone. From the very definition of the word it
will be seen that it extends to all who suffer from it, "it is
the continuous doing of something which interferes with
another's health or comfort in the occupation of his property." Now if the same thing which is a nuisance to an
adjoining owner is established to have interfered with the health
and comfort of another (but not an adjoining owner), in the occupation of his property, upon what principle is one to recover
and the other not ? There is none !! The true principle is-a nuisance is a nuisance to all who experience it, without any question
of adjoining or neighboring owner. Of course, an adjoining
owner may suffer a nuisance which does not affect a neighboring
owner, but this is a question of fact, not of principle.
There is another important question in proving an actionable
nuisance, and that is the appropriatenessof the place for the
work carried on. Upon this point, JESSEL, M. R.,2 said he followed Mr.Justice MELLOn, in St. Hdens' Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 House of Lords Cas. 642, where the latter held, an actionable nuisance was the producing sensible discomfort to one
person. Then he went on to say that in an action for nuisance
to property arising from noxious vapors, the injury to be actionable must be such as visibly to diminish the value of the property and the comfort and enjoyment of it. The jury ought to
consider all the circumstances, including locality, and that with
respect to this, it was clear that in counties where great works
had been erected and carried on, persons must not stand on their
1
Crump v. Lambert, L. R., 3 Eq. 412, per RomILLY, M. R.
2 Salvin v. NNorth Brancepeth Coal Co., L. R., 9 Ch.App. 705.
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extreme rights and bring actions in respect of every matter of

annoyance, for if so, the business of the whole county would
be seriously interfered with. Lord1 CRANWORTH said, upon the
question of appropriateness of place, 1 "I remember trying an
action for an injury from smoke, in the town of Shields. It
was proven that smoke did come and interfere with the plaintiff, but I said, you must look at it not with a view to the question whether, abstractedly that quantity of smoke was a nuisance, but whether it was a nuisance to a person living in the
town of Shields, because if it only added in an infinitesimal degree to the quantity of smoke, I held that the state of the town
rendered it altogether impossible to call that an actionable nuisance." This is the same principle which lead the court below
in .fCaffrey's App.,2 to refuse the injunction to stop the works.
But independent of the fact of a person going to a nuisance
or of a nuisance previously existing-as smoke in Shieldswhere the smoke only added to the nuisance in an infinitesimal
degree, there yet remains a well-defined principle, which governs
the question. As was said by Lord SELLBORNE, L. C.,3 " any
houses have stables attached to them, but a man who turns the
whole ground floor of a London house into a stable, or otherwise
keeps a stable so near a neighbor's living rooms that the inhabitants are disturbed all night, does so at his own risk; in making
out a case of nuisance of this character, there are always two things
to be considered-the right of the plaintiff and the right of the
defendant. If either party turns his house, or any part of it to
unusual purposes, in such manner as to produce a substantial
injury to his neighbor, it appears to me that that is not, according to principle or authority, a reasonable use of his own property, and his neighbor showing substantial injury, is entitled
to protection."
A most important point in this question of appropriateness of
place, is this-to whom should this question be left? In the case
I have lately referred to4 Mr. Justice MELOR put the following
question to the jury-was the place appropriate? Although
I St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tinpping, 11 House of Lords 652.
2 15 W. N. C. 12.
SBall v. Bay, 8 L. R., Ch. App. 469.
4St. Hdens Smelting Ca. v. Tipping, suipna.
VOL. XXXVI.-3
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the correctness of this was most vehemently assailed, yet it was
the unanimous opinion of the House of Lords that the question
was correctly put.
Is a city an appropriate place in which to run locomotives and
trains of cars 1,440 movements per day, with the accompanying
noise, soot, smoke, cinders, etc., etc.? I should think the question hardly admitted of doubt. It has been decided in recent
cases in England in the negative, as already stated. Besides, if
there is a doubt, the question should be left to the jury.
A railroad authorized by the legislature to run into the heart
of a city, although creating a nuisance, could not be restrained
from carrying out that which the legislature has willed it to
carry out, for it would be a reductio ad absurdum to permit an
individual to prevent that being done which the legislature
intended to be done at all events.' As the nuisance cannot be
restrained damages are recoverable unless the legislature is sovereign to legalize the nuisance ;2 in England parliament is sovereign in all things; in Pennsylvania the legislature on this particular point is subordinate to the Constitution.
Briefly summarizing my conclusions, I find as follows, viz.:
(1). By the amended Constitution of 1838 it was provided that
compensation should be made for land actually taken; at
that time, however, public highways were ordinary roadsrailroads not yet having come into use-hence it was felt that
the Constitution, by providing compensation for land actually
taken, was affording an adequate remedy.
(2). But later on, between the years 1838 and 1849, railroads
appeared, and it was soon found by the decisions of the courts
that the Constitution of 1838 had not provided adequate relief,
hence the General Railroad Act of 1849.
(3). When these general laws were tested in the courts they
also were found wanting. They did much toward remedying the
evil, it is true, but they did not go far enough ; recovery under
I Hammersmith, etc., Rd. v. Brand, supra, per Lord CAmNs, L. C.

2 All that is said upon this subject in Wood's Railway Law, H 212 and 213,
must proceed from the English cases cited, where parliament is sovereign to
legalize a nuisance, or from cases in States where the legislature is sovereign
upon this point, not being controlled therein by a constitutional provision.
It is positively inapplicable to Pennsylvania, where the legislature is so controlled.
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these laws was granted for land taken; this, however, was obligatory under the Constitution of 1838 ; and also damages for
injury to the remaining land where any land had been taken.
But where no land was taken there was no recovery for any
damage. This was thoroughly inequitable; these corporations
for the public good could be authorized to construct their roads
wherever seemed advisable to their corporators, and being for
the public good, even though they produced a nuisance, they
could not be restrained from carrying out their purposes, and
under the laws they were not liable for damages, even if an
acknowledged nuisance, unless they had taken land; to remedy
this lack of equality provisions further extending the remedy
were incorporated in the new Constitution of 1874.
(4). The phraseology of the new Constitution is peculiar. It is
not, liketheamended Constitution of 1838, corporationsshallnotbe
invested with eminent domain, but, corporationsinvested with eminent domain, that is, it designates, as subject to the remedy, the
class of corporations which are invested with eminent domain.
Who are so invested? Why, those who accomplish a public
benefit-railroads, canals, etc., etc.-these are liable to produce
a distinct and particular injury, peculiar to themselves, and it
was against these distinct and peculiar injuries that the Constitution was intended to provide a remedy; then follows the remedial clause, shall make compensation for property taken, injured,
or destroyed.
(5). The maxim, damnum absque injuria, does not mean that
an injury, in order to be a legal injury, must be one within the
common law; it only means that legal wrong and legal remedy
are correlative terms; it would be more correctly stated, where
there is no legal remedy, there is no legal wrong; it has nothing
to do with whether the injury is under the common law, the injury may be saved from being damnum absque injuria as well
by a statute or a constitutional provision as by the common law.
(6). In all the cases in our Supreme Court, upon the question
of damages, the court used the maxim damnum absque injuria,to
show that the plaintiffs were not within the remedy. There is no
intention, not even the suspicion of one, to decide what are common-law wrongs. A common-law wrong may still be damnum
absque injuriaunless there is a remedy for the plaintiff; instance,
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a quasi public corporation 1 be exempted from all damages by a
sovereign legislature.
(7). There are, of course, a large class of injuries for which there
should be no recovery under the constitutional provision, thus:
(a) Loss of business (1) where the railroad has invaded no right
of property; or (2) where the loss of custom results merely
from the railroad carrying on its business, as loss to turnpikes
and canals, to taverns or public houses left in obscurity, to stagecoach proprietors and companies, to owners of dwelling-houses,
manufactories, wharves, and all other real estate in towns and
villages for which the line of travel has been diverted. (b) Carelessness and negligence have their own remedies, and are not
within the constitutional provision. (c) Purely speculative injuries cannot be considered. (d) Or injuries resulting from the
act of God. (e) Or where the injury is common to all alike,
this, of course, being too remote.
(8). But the true principle is, where the property is subjected to
a perpetual servitude, the owner's interest in tile property to the
extent of the servitude is injured; in other words, where there
is an injury t6 property, the direct result of the company's operations, the property is legally injured, save as qualified by the
next proposition, to wit: what is the natural use and enjoyment
of land, or, in other words, what is an actionable nuisance?
(9). The underlying principle is, where a neighbor's property is
subjected to a servitude which is not appropriateto the place
where it occurs, and which is not the natural use of the land, it
is a legal nuisance.
(10). Appropriateness of place would be illustrated by smoke
in a large manufacturing place like Pittsburgh-in Pennsylvania, or Shields-in England, or again, by the publishing
business in McCaffrey's App., in Philadelphia, in so far as restraining it by an injunction.
(11). Is a steam railway and 1,440 movements in the heart of
a city, in an appropriate place? Mr. Justice BLACKBURN, in a
very recent case in the House of Lords said, in effect, it is
agreed upon all hands that it is not. Again, in another case, in
which Mr. Justice MELLOR, in the court below-nuisance from
smoke from smelting-works-put to the jury the question: Is
1 PUsburgh, etc., B. 1. Cb. v. Jries,supra.

DOMAIN UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

the place appropriate? It was unanimously held in the House
of Lords, that the question was properly put to the jury, and it
was for them to decide, and not for the court-the appropriateness of the place.
(12). A nuisance, per se, on principle, is never confined to an
adjoining property, but extends to all who establish substantial
injury. Upon what principle could noise, smoke, soot, burning cinders, dust, dirt, odors, and offensive vapors, be confined to
an adjoining property, when one in the neighborhood establishes
the fact that he has experienced the same substantial injury?
(13). A nuisance created by the legislature-a railroad running into a city-must continue to exist for the public good,
hence cannot be restrained by an injunctiJn, for it would be a
reductio ad abszrdum to permit an ind:vidual to prevent that

being done, which the legislature intended to be done at all
events.
(14). Hence, as the nuisance cannot be restrained, damages
are recoverable, unless the legislature was sovereign, to legalize
the nuisance.
(15). In England, parliament is sovereign in all things; with
us in Pennsylvania, the legislature on this particular point is
subordinate to the Constitution. The legislature can permit
the nuisance to be done at all events, but the Constitution says:
subject to the payment of damages.
(16). Noise, smoke, soot, dirt, gases, etc., and the shifting of
1,440 trains per day in a city, near residences, is clearly a nuisance, for it is clearly not an appropriate place for the same.'
(17). And, finally, the place not being appropriate and substantial injury being established, then upon principle and
universal authority, the question whether one is an adjoining or
neighboring owner should be unheard of, and it would follow
that recovery should be granted.
For these reasons, it seems that the late decision in Pennsylvania Bl-1. v. Lippincott, was an error. This decision is contrary
to all rules of construction. I do not mean, being a remedial
1 In this case, there can be no doubt that the place was not appropriate, but
had there been a doubt, or in any case where there is a doubt, the question of
appropriatenes-s should ba left to the jury. This principle was abundantly
sustained in a hotly-contested case in the House of Lords. Note 2, p. 16.
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statute, it should be favorably construed-let it be strictly construed, I acceptthis; but therestill remains the well-known ruleof such universal application as to have become axiomatic-that
the words of a Constitution should be taken in their commonsense, every day meaning. It has been said, in effect, from our
Supreme Bench, we care not what the members of the Constitutional Convention took the words of the Constitution to
mean, but the question is: What do we take them to mean ? But
it must be remembered that the axiomatic principle is, that the
words of a Constitution, voted upon by the people, shall be construed to have been used by them in their ordinary sense. But
we even waive this als.o, yet the decision still remains unsound;
because when property is subjected to a servitude, the owner's
interest in it, to the extent of that servitude, is injured, and if the
servitude is of the character of a nuisance, whether a legal injury
will depend upon the appropriateness of place. If there is any
doubt upon this point, the question of appropriatenessshould be
left to the jury,' and finally, the place being inappropriate, the
nuisance existing, then there is no principle or authority upon
which the nuisance can be confined to an adjoiningowner, when
the fact is established that a neighboring owner has experienced
the same servitude.
In conclusion, I wish to disclaim any intention of attempting
to decide, from a legal point of view, whether a steam railway
coming into the heart of a city is a nuisance, or not. I only
insist that this depends upon the appropriatenessof place and
of time, which questions should be left to the jury.
R. MAsoN LISLE.
Philadelphia, October, 1887.
1 There could hardly be much doubt that a steam railway running into the
heart of a city, with its noise, dust, dirt, soot, cinders, etc., and 1,440 movements per day, was not in an appropriate place. It has been so conceded in the
late English cases, already referred to. But if there were a doubt, the point
should be left to the jury. So long as trial by jury is willed by the people, let
them do the work belonging to them. In a common-law action questions of
fact clearly belong to the jury and they ought to decide them. In the case of
an injunction to restrain, a different principle is applicable: HcCaffrey's App.,
15 W. N. C. 12.

